Abstract. At SAC '97, Itoh, Okamoto and Mambo presented a fast public key cryptosystem. After analyzing several attacks including latticereduction attacks, they claimed that its security was high, although the cryptosystem had some resemblances with the former knapsack cryptosystems, since decryption could be viewed as a multiplicative knapsack problem. In this paper, we show how to recover the private key from a fraction of the public key in less than 10 minutes for the suggested choice of parameters. The attack is based on a systematic use of the notion of the orthogonal lattice which we introduced as a cryptographic tool at Crypto '97. This notion allows us to attack the linearity hidden in the scheme.
Introduction
Two decades after the discovery of public key cryptography, only a few asymmetric encryption schemes exist, and the most practical public key schemes are still very slow compared to conventional secret key schemes. Extensive research has been conducted on public-key cryptography based on the knapsack problem. Knapsack-like cryptosystems are quite interesting: they are easy to implement, can attain very high encrypt/decrypt rates, and do not require expensive operations. Unfortunately, all the cryptosystems based on the additive knapsack problem have been broken, mainly by means of lattice-reduction techniques. Linearity is probably the biggest weakness of these schemes.
To overcome this problem, multiplicative knapsacks have been proposed as an alternative. The idea of multiplicative knapsack is roughly 20 years old and was rst proposed in the open literature by Merkle and Hellman 3] in their original paper. Merkle-Hellman's knapsack was (partially) cryptanalyzed by Odlyzko 8] , partly because only decryption was actually multiplicative, while encryption was additive.
Recently, two new public-key cryptosystems based on the multiplicative knapsack problem have been proposed: the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem 4] presented at Eurocrypt '97, and the Itoh-Okamoto-Mambo cryptosystem 1] presented at SAC '97. In the latter one, both encryption and decryption were relatively fast. After analyzing several attacks including lattice-reduction attacks, Itoh, Okamoto and Mambo claimed that the security of their cryptosystem was high.
We present a very e ective attack against this cryptosystem. In practice, one can recover the private key from the public key in less than 10 minutes for the suggested choice of parameters. The attack is based on a systematic use of the notion of the orthogonal lattice which we introduced as a cryptographic tool at Crypto ' 97 5] . As in 5, 7, 6] , this technique enables us to attack the linearity hidden in the keys generation process.
Description of the Cryptosystem
The message space is Z M , the ring of integers modulo an integer M. Let N be a product of two large primes P and Q. Let l and n be integers such that l n. Select positive integers q 1 ; : : : ; q n less than P 1=l and distinct primes q Choose an integer t in Z N coprime with P, and integers k 1 ; : : : ; k n in Z N satisfying the following congruence:
k i tq i (mod P): Finally, select random elements e 1 ; : : : ; e n in Z M .
The public key consists of: the (e i ; k i )'s, M, N, n and l. The secret key consists of: P, Q, t, the q i 's and the q 0 i 's. 
Encryption

Parameters
In their paper 1], Itoh, Okamoto and Mambo analyzed several possible attacks, including a lattice-reduction attack. They concluded that their cryptosystem was secure for the following choice of parameters:
{ N = 1024 bits, P = 768 bits and Q = 256 bits. { n = 180 and l = 17. { q max = 2 45 (6 bytes) and q 0 max = 2 32 (4 bytes). In this example, the public key takes 45 Kbytes and the private key takes 1.8 Kbytes. Compared to RSA-1024 with small exponent, encryption speed is similar, but decryption is about 50 times faster.
The Orthogonal Lattice
We recall a few useful facts about the notion of an orthogonal lattice, which was introduced in 5] as a cryptographic tool. Let L be a lattice in Z n where n is any integer. The orthogonal lattice L ? is de ned as the set of elements in Z n which are orthogonal to all the lattice points of L, with respect to the usual dot product. In practice, one obtains a simple and very e ective algorithm (which consists of a single lattice reduction, described in 5]) to compute a reduced basis of the orthogonal lattice, thanks to the celebrated LLL algorithm 2]. This means that, given a low-dimensional L in Z n , one can easily compute many short and linearly independent vectors in L ? .
Attacking the Scheme by Orthogonal Lattices
Let m be an integer less than n. De This quantity is much smaller than the right quantity of (1) when m is large enough, so that we make the following assumption: If this hypothesis holds, one can use the Gaussian algorithm for lattice reduction (which has worst-case polynomial time and average-case constant time) to recover q.
Next, we easily recover the secret factorization P Q using the so-called di erential attack described in 1]. More precisely, there exist integers p 1 ; : : : ; p n such that:
Therefore, we have for all i 6 = j: q j k i ? q i k j (p i q j ? p j q i )P (mod N):
It is likely that gcd(q j k i ? q i k j ; N) is equal to P. And if it is not, we can try again with a di erent (i; j).
To sum up, the attack is the following:
1. Select an integer m n. Once q and the secret factorization of N are found, it is not a problem to recover the rest of the secret key:
{ t modulo P is given by k i tq i (mod P). { The q 0 i 's (or something equivalent) are revealed by the factors of the q i 's.
Experiments
We implemented the attack using the NTL package 9] which includes e cient lattice-reduction algorithms. We used the LLL oating point version with extended exponent to compute orthogonal lattices, since the entries of k were too large (about the size of N) for the usual oating point version.
In practice, the attack reveals the secret factorization as soon as m 4 for the suggested choice of parameters. When m 20, the total computation time is less than 10 minutes on a UltraSparc-I clocked at 167 MHz. 
